State of Utah v. Todd May : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
State of Utah v. Todd May : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary R. Heward; Attorney for Appellee.
John T. Caine; Richards, Caine and Allen, P.C.; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. May, No. 20030004 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4130
^-«* 1 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Appellee, 
vs. 
TODD MAY, 
Appellant. 
CASE NO. 2Q030004-CA 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, UTAH 
The Honorable Ernie W. Jones, District Judge 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM A JUDGEMENT OF CONVICTION FOR ACTING AS A 
PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR WITHOUT A LICENSE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. §53-9-107(2), A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR UNDER §53-9-119, IN 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, THE STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE ERNIE W. JONES PRESIDING. 
JOHN T. CAINE 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, PC. 
2568 Washington Boulevard, S t / 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
GARY R. HEWARD 
Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Boulevard, Ste 230 
Attorney for Appellee 
Ute^ Court of <k&p&&i$ 
,«'-( >f* S*'~ r -t f t f W y ' * 
Pautette Stacg 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1-3 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3-4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4-6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6-8 
ARGUMENT 8 
I. THE STATE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT LICENSED AS A PRIVATE 
INVESTIGATOR WHEN HE SOLICITED HIS SERVICES AS 
SUCH 8-12 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED §53-9-107 TO 
FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY OF ACTING AS A PRIVATE 
INVESTIGATOR WITHOUT A LICENSE 13-20 
III. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN AND LISTEN 
TO A TAPE OF A CONVERSATION DEFENDANT HAD WITH 
AN UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATOR DOES NOT AMOUNT TO 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE 
COUNSEL MADE HIS DECISION AFTER REASONABLE 
INVESTIGATION 21-27 
CONCLUSION 28 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Sixth Amendment 3, 21 
Fourteenth Amendment .'. 3 
CASES . . 
United States Supreme Court Case 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984) 8, 21,22,23,25 
Utah State Cases 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993) 24, 25, 27 
Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155 (Utah 1980) 14 
Grand County v. Emery County, 52 P.3d 1148 (Utah 2002) 2 
Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielson & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1995) 13 
In re Adoption ofB.T.D., 68 P.3d 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 2 
State v. Bates, 784P.2d 1126 (Utah 1989) .. ......' 8 
State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701 (Utah 1985) 24 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989) 22 
State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2000) 13, 19 
State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 26, 27 
State v. Coonce, 36 P.3d 533 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) 25, 26 
State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1987) 8, 9,12 
n 
State v. Holbert, 61 P.3d 291 (Utah 2002) 2, 3 
State v. Huggins, 920 P.2d 1195 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 22, 23 
State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991) 22 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) 21, 27 
State v. Tennyson, 850P.2d461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 22 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993) 2,12 
State v. Tyler, 850P.2d 1250 (Utah 1993) 22 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989) 19 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated 
Section 7-14-5 15 
Section 12-1-1 15 
Section 3 lA-21-302(2) 18 
Section 53-9-102 2, 3, 7, 13, 14, 17 
Section 53-9-107 2,3,4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19,20 
Section 53-9-108 14 
Section 53-9-119 4 
Section 61-1-2(1) 18 
Section 76-6-517 15 
Section 76-7-203 18 
iii 
Section 78-2a-3(2) 1 
Other State Statutes 
N.M. STAT. ANN. section 61-27A-2(L)(Michie 2003) 18 
N.Y. McKinney's General Business Law section 20-7-71(l)(2003) 18 
UTAH RULES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 23B 26 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 11(b) 9 
IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Appellee, ] 
vs. 
TODD MAY, 
Appellant. 
) CASE NO. 20030004-CA 
APPEAL FROM THE SECOND DISTRICT 
COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, UTAH 
The Honorable Ernie W. Jones, District Judge 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2). The district court entered a final order on March 18, 2002. 
Notice of this Appeal was filed on December 27, 2002. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
First Issue on Appeal: Did the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
sting operation occurred when Defendant was not licensed as a private investigator? 
Standard of Review: This is a question of fact, and thus an Appellate court 
• • • • • • • • • • • M W W W W W W I l i ^ ^ I.UJLIIillJ.UIIlUJMaMlUlllL. 
should apply the clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's factual findings because the 
trial court's advantaged position in judging credibility and resolving evidentiary conflicts. 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993)(The trial court's findings of fact in 
support of its ruling will not be set aside unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous). 
Second Issue on Appeal: Did the trial court correctly apply §53-9-107 and §53-9-
102(17) in determining that Defendant acted as a private investigator without a license? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law that an Appellate court reviews for correctness. In Re Adoption ofB.T.D., 68 P.3d 
1021, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). The Appellate court reviews the district court's 
determination for correctness and gives no deference to its legal conclusions. Grand 
County v. Emery County, 52 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Utah 2002). 
Third Issue on Appeal: Whether Defense Counsel's failure to obtain and listen to 
a tape of the conversation defendant had with an undercover investigator amounts to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Standard of Review: An Appellate court must determine as a matter of fact and 
law whether Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. In order to succeed on 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant must show (1) trial counsel's 
performance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 
(2) trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Defendant by depriving him of a fair 
trial. State v. Holbert, 61 P.3d 291 (Utah 2002). When presented with an ineffective 
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assistance of counsel claim for the first time on appeal, review of conmei s pci 'ormance 
under this test is highly deferential when there is ii> - pi .* - e\ ment ia i . .* m : 
CONSITl'L1'! 1Q1NAL PROVISIONS, S I \ * i -1 .-. \ N D RL i ^ 
Unilinil ^liiir-s «m uiisiiliihn iiii iiiniiii amendment '•- -•• ••••.••'•. - - ;<i--;"; 
\\ , r ; cnmmal prosecution-- UK: accused ^hall en!o. die ugh ' {* . 
spcedx and public inai. by an impanial iun oi !ne Stale and district w m 'ein 
the crime shall h a \ c been eommuu\ l . which disinct shall have beei 
previously ascertained b \ law ;*n * f* be informed of the nature and can v. *. f 
the accusation. \o he confronted with the witnesses against him: u> ha^ i 
compulsor\ process for obtaining witnesses in his fri <M ^ to h n ^ 
assistance of counsc1 *•*** —r defence 
ourteenth Amendment § 1 
\ l ; person^ hem ot naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the I 'nited States and of the State 
w herein the\ reside \ o State shall wn\k: or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or nnnns^ue* ot citizens of the I nited States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, libem . o: piopern. \\ ithout me 
process of law: nor denv *o •*"* *-^ ^ ^ H]-<* * "•' < -it non 'he v\:uai 
protect" -~ 4 rU-% •" 
"Private investigator or pri\ ate detecti\ e" means any person, except 
collection agencies and credit reporting agencies, who, for consideration, 
engages in business or accepts employment to conduct any investigation for 
the purpose of obtaining informatr itU -efercne»* * [certain listed 
areas]. 
'", I ill 1 . J , * inn k;SMM07(2)(a). 
yl; Ln ie^ licensed under this chapter, a person may not: 
(a) act or assume to act as, or represent himself to be: •. 
/ a licensee, or 
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(ii) a private investigator or private detective as defined in 
Subsection 53-9-102(16) or conduct any investigation as 
provided in subsection 53-9-102(16)(The current code 
mistakenly refers to subsection 16 when it should be 17)(This 
brief will refer to subsection 17 when appropriate). 
Utah Code Ann. §53-9-119. 
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter is 
guilty of a class A Misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with representing himself as a private investigator when he 
was without a license in violation of Utah Code Ann. §53-9-107(2). R. 001-002. 
Following a bench trial, the trial court found Defendant guilty. R. 014-016. Defendant 
was sentenced to 30 days in jail or a $750 fine. R. 014-016. Defendant then filed an 
untimely appeal. R. 026, 032-033. Defendant was resentenced on December 11, 2002. 
R. 038. Defendant then filed this timely appeal on December 27, 2002. R. 050. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In May 1996, Defendant received a valid private investigator's license from the 
Department of Public Safety. This license was renewed in May 1998. R. 56:15. In May 
2000, Defendant failed to renew his private investigator's license. R. 56:15. After the 
expiration of Defendant's license, the Department of Public Safety sent him application 
forms to reapply for the private investigator's license; left a voice mail outlining how he 
was to reapply; and a sent letter on November 13, 2000, stating he was not to work as a 
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private investigator until he was relicensed to do so. R. 56:16-17. Defendant failed to 
reapply for a private investigator's license until December 27, 2001. R. 56:16. 
Defendant was still without a license at the time of trial. R. 56:22. 
During the summer of 2001, Dick Martin, a private investigator, became 
concerned that Defendant was functioning as a private investigator without a license. 
Dick Martin contacted Steve Anderson, an agent for the Department of Public Safety, and 
the two set up a sting operation to investigate Defendant's actions. R. 56:20. 
On August 27, 2001, Steve Martin, Dick Martin's son, went to Defendant's place 
of business and told Defendant a fictitious story by stating that he was concerned his 
fiancee was having an affair. R 56:57. However, before entering Defendant's place of 
business, Steve Martin concealed a tape recorder to record the conversation. R. 56:69. 
After hearing Steve Martin's story, Defendant offered to conduct a private investigation. 
R. 56:57-58, 63-66. Steve Martin did not hire Defendant because he did not have the 
$500 retainer Defendant wanted and he was still "shopping" around. R. 56:64, 66. Based 
upon the events of the sting, Defendant was charged with acting as a private investigator 
without a license. R. 001-002. 
A week before trial, the State received the tape containing the alleged conversation 
between Defendant and Steve Martin. R. 56:118. The prosecutor notified Defense 
Counsel and made available the tape. R. 56:118. Defense counsel refused the tape 
because he thought the tape would not be necessary. R. 56:118. On March 18, 2002 a 
5 
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bench trial was held where Defendant was convicted of the charge. R. 014-016. 
Defendant was sentenced to 30 days jail or a $750 fine. R. 014-016. 
Defendant filed uprose notice of appeal on May 17, 2002. R. 026. Through 
assistance of current counsel, Defendant sought to have his untimely appeal construed as 
an extension of time to file an appeal. The Appellate Court ruled that the appeal was 
untimely and did not seek an extension of time. R. 030. On December 11, 2002, 
Defendant was resentenced. R. 038. On December 27, 2002, Defendant filed this timely 
appeal. R. 050. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First, time is not an express statutory element of the crime of representing oneself 
as a private investigator without a license. Because the State charged Defendant with 
functioning as a private investigator without a license, the State's burden is to prove 
Defendant acted as a private investigator when he was not properly licensed. Even if the 
State failed to prove the exact date in which the sting operation occurred, the 
uncontradicted evidence is that Defendant's private investigator license expired in May 
2000, that the sting operation occurred between the summer of 2001 and December 2001, 
Defendant did not attempt to renew his license until December 2001, and Defendant was 
still unlicensed at the time of trial. Even if the State failed to prove the exact date of the 
sting, the State has proven that the sting occurred well after the license expired, and well 
before Defendant even applied for a new license. Given these facts, it was not clear error 
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for the trial court to conclude that the State proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Defendant solicited his services as a private investigator during the period he was not 
licensed to do so. 
Second, the trial court properly interpreted subsection 102(17) of the Private 
Investigator Regulation Act (" Act") in concluding that the statute does not require actual 
exchange of consideration between two parties. UTAH CODE ANN. §53-9-102(17). 
Subsection 102(17) of the Act only requires that consideration be part of the basis of the 
bargain; nowhere in the statute does it specifically state that consideration must actually 
be exchanged between two parties. Testimony offered by Steve Martin unequivocally 
shows Defendant solicited his private investigative services for consideration, but 
consideration was not exchanged because Martin did not have the amount of money 
Defendant wanted as a retainer. 
Finally, tactical decisions which ultimately prove unfruitful at trial do not amount 
to ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's counsel chose not to listen to a tape 
containing an alleged conversation between Defendant and Steve Martin. When the tape 
was made available a week before trial, Defense counsel already had a theory of the case 
that did not necessitate the tape. Defense counsel was familiar with the case and the facts 
because he had the report of the incident and his client told him of the conversation. 
Thus, he could properly exclude the tape as unnecessary evidence. Such a tactical 
decision not to seek this evidence made after reasonable investigation does not amount to 
7 
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ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Even if this Court finds that Defense counsel's decision amounts to ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Defendant has still failed to specify how the failure to obtain the 
tape was prejudicial to his defense. Instead, Defendant offers sweeping and conclusory 
statements which require the Court to speculate as to how the failure to obtain such a tape 
might amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court should not engage in such 
speculation, but should reject Defendant's argument because he has failed to establish 
either prong of the ineffective assistance test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 688 (1984). 
ARGUMENT 
I . . ' • : ^ . : v ; . n ; • 
THE STATE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT LICENSED AS A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR 
WHEN HE SOLICITED HIS SERVICES AS SUCH. 
Generally, the time an offense was committed is not an element that the 
prosecution must prove at trial. State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1213 (Utah 1987); State 
v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1989). However, there are instances when time must be 
proven, such as when time is an express statutory element. Some examples may be if the 
statute of limitations has almost run, if the defendant asserts he was of requisite age, or if 
the age of the victim would prevent the act from being criminal. In such situations, the 
prosecution bears "the burden to prove [time as an additional aspect or element of its 
8 
case] beyond a reasonable doubt." Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1213. 
It is well settled that the law makes no distinction between direct evidence and 
circumstantial evidence as to the degree of proof required for conviction, but respects 
each for such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a reasonable method of 
proof. Either will support a verdict of guilty if it carries the convincing qualities required 
by law. 
In this case, the State marshaled both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the sting operation occurred when the Defendant 
was not licensed as a private investigator. First, Defendant admits in his own version of 
the facts that the sting operation occurred on August 27, 2001. (Brief of Appellant at 6). 
Because Appellant is duty-bound to make only true and accurate representations to the 
Court, this Court should accept this admission as a true fact. See Utah R. Civ.P. 11(b). 
Second, an evaluation of Steve Anderson's testimony reveals that before May 
2000 Defendant had a valid private investigator's license, but failed to renew it after 
several unsuccessful attempts by Steve Anderson to get him to renew it. The sting 
operation occurred after Defendant's private investigator license lapsed: 
Q. Okay. Again, as your position a, in keeping the records of licenses a, are there 
any other licenses issued to Todd May for private investigative work? 
A. No, there's not. 
Q. Has that license been renewed? 
9 
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A. It has. He's renewed it once since 1996. Licenses are good for two years. He a, 
got the initial license in '96 and he renewed, renewed in '98. And then this one 
expired in 2000 and he failed to renew it since. 
Q. So since May of 2000 has there been any renewal? 
A. . . . [H]e reapplied a, let's see, December 27th, 2001 after he was charged [with 
acting as a private investigator without a license]. 
R.56:15. 
Q. When did you decide to do a sting operation? 
A. Oh, I can't remember exactly when I made the first decision. It was a, after he 
had ignored the a, applications that we had sent him I was planning on contacting 
another member of our department to go in there. So it was last summer [2001] a, 
that it I had planned on doing something. 
R.56:24. 
Anderson's conversation with the trial judge explicitly proves that the sting was 
conducted only after Defendant's license expired: 
The Judge: And why were you considering a sting operation? 
The Witness: Because Todd May failed to a, get licensed after repeated attempts. 
R. 56:51. 
A fair and accurate reading of Steve Anderson's testimony confirms that the 
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was licensed as a private 
10 
investigator until May 2000, the sting operation occurred between the summer of 2001 
and December 2001, and Defendant was not licensed as a private investigator at the time 
of the sting operation. 
The prosecutor's direct examination of Steve Martin reveals that the sting occurred 
approximately during the summer of 2001: 
Q. Okay. Do you recall the date [of the sting]? 
A. It was September of last year from what I recall. I don't recall a date, no. 
Q. Okay. Could it have been in August? 
A. It could have been. 
R.56:54. 
The sting occurred on August 27, 2001. Even though Steve Martin could not 
remember the exact date, he clearly remembers the general time frame of the sting. The 
veracity of his testimony is corroborated by Anderson's testimony that the sting occurred 
between the summer of 2001 and December 2001. Regardless of whether the sting 
occurred during August or September, this is still well beyond the expiration of 
Defendant's private investigative license, and well before Defendant attempted to renew 
his license. Defendant himself admits he has not had a valid license since 2000. R. 
56:98. Therefore, even if the prosecution failed to prove the exact date in which this sting 
operation occurred, the State met its burden by showing the encounter occurred while the 
Defendant was without a license. 
11 
Trial courts are afforded great deference in resolving factual issues because of their 
ability to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270. 
Here, the trial court was required to listen and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses 
in resolving the factual disputes of whether the sting occurred when the Defendant was 
without a license and whether Defendant's actions amounted to a violation under §53-9-
107(2). Based on their testimony, the trial court found Defendant guilty. Applying a 
deferential standard to the trial court's verdict, it cannot be said that the trial court was 
clearly erroneous in concluding that Defendant represented himself as a private 
investigator and he agreed to do private investigative work for a fee while he was not 
properly licensed. 
Additionally, because time is not an express statutory element of this crime, "the 
prosecution does not have to prove the precise time of the offense, [and] insufficiency of 
the evidence on [this] point is not a ground upon which the verdict can be attacked." 
Fulton, 742P.2dat 1213. 
12 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED §53-9-107 TO FIND 
DEFENDANT GUILTY OF ACTING AS A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR 
WITHOUT A LICENSE. 
Section 107 of the Act states: 
[u]nless licensed under this chapter, a person may not: (a) act 
or assume to act as, or represent himself to be: (i) a licensee; 
or (ii) a private investigator or private detective as defined in 
Subsection 53-9-102(16) or conduct any investigation as 
provided in Subsection, 53-9-201(16). [meaning (17)] 
UTAH CODE ANN. §53-9-107(2). 
The definition of private investigator is located earlier in this section of the code. 
'Private investigator or private detective' means any person, 
except collection agencies and credit reporting agencies, who, 
for consideration, engages in business or accepts employment 
to conduct any investigation for the purpose of obtaining 
information with reference to: . . . [certain listed areas]. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §53-9-102(17). 
Whether the trial court correctly applied the preceding statutes is a matter of 
statutory interpretation. 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve. To discover that intent, we look first to 
the plain language of the statute. 
Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995) (Internal 
quotations omitted). 
In analyzing a statute's plain language, we must attempt to 
give each part of the provision a relevant and independent 
meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms. 
State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795, 800 (Utah 2000). 
13 
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Evaluating section 107's plain language reveals that its intent is to prevent 
individuals from functioning as a private investigator without a license. Legislatures 
often enact licensing statutes for the "protection of members of the public who rely on 
licensed . . . [professionals] to perform tasks that require a high degree of honesty and 
integrity." Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 
(Utah 1980). Private investigators conduct activities that clearly require honesty and 
integrity to prevent unscrupulous individuals from committing blackmail or extortion. 
The legislature has chosen to combat this problem by requiring individuals and 
companies to obtain a license before engaging in these activities. This is clear from 
section 107's section title, "License required to act." This section specifically explains 
that individuals need licenses to function as private investigators. The following section, 
sectionl08, outlines in length the qualifications for licensure. Analyzing section 107 in 
relation to section 108 and the other Chapter 9 sections confinns that the legislative intent 
was to prohibit individuals from functioning as a private investigator without a license. 
Examination of those individuals and companies excluded further confirms the 
need to construe private investigation activities broadly. Collection agencies, credit 
reporting agencies, persons or employees conducting personal investigations or 
investigations for their employer, and employees of licensed attorneys are excluded from 
the definition of private investigator. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-9-102(17)(a-b). This is 
most likely because these businesses and individuals are regulated under other provisions 
14 
of the Utah Code. Collection agencies are regulated by § 12-1-1. Credit reporting 
agencies are regulated by § 76-6-517, § 7-14-5, and others. Attorneys, who have a direct 
responsibility for the conduct of their employees, are regulated by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 5.3. Private persons were probably excluded 
because they are not working for another. Employees were probably excluded because 
another person has direct supervisory authority and potential liability for their wrongs 
under the tort theory of respondeat superior. Thus, all of these people and businesses 
have checks on them that general private investigators do not; hence the need for the 
licensing statute to protect members of the public is clear. 
The prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant did not have a 
license at the time of the sting. Defendant violated section 107 because he represented 
himself as a private investigator. Steve Martin's testimony unequivocally shows that 
Defendant represented himself as a private investigator: 
Q. . . . So what did you present him [Defendant] with? What did you ask him or-
A. I just asked him a, I asked him if, what kind of operations they ran, a, if they 
would be able to conduct an investigation, a, I-
Q. Okay. 
A. He asked me to explain about my fiancee that might be having a-
Q. What type, did he indicate what type of operations they ran? 
A. Private investigations. • 
15 
R.56:57-58. 
Q. Did he [Defendant] ever use the term private investigations? 
A. Yes, sir. K; • 
i Q. Did he use the term investigation? 
-•'. A. Yes. . : : , - ; . : , ' , , , ; 
R.56:63-64. ;
 K . ,.,,.-; ;,-,• ,;..;•.\-;-
Q. . . . Did a, the defendant ever mention who would be doing the investigative 
work? , ••rJ.. v.-:••.," 
A. Yes,hedid. 
Q. And who did he say? 
A. Himself and Ryan. 
Q. Okay. Was that the defendant speaking? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And a, did you specifically ask him that question or-
A.Yes,Idid. 
Q. Okay. And do you recall if you used the term investigating? 
A. Yes. I asked a, specifically who would be doing the investigation. And he said 
myself and Ryan. 
Q. When did they want to get started? r 
A. Right away, actually. They wanted to start right away. But I, for one didn't have 
16 
the cash if I would have, and two, I was on my way to work. I was shopping. 
R.56:65-66. 
Subsection 107(2) of the Private Investigator Regulation Act states that it is a 
violation to represent oneself or act as a private investigator without a license. During the 
course of the conversation with Steve Martin, Defendant unambiguously offered to act as 
Steve Martin's private investigator for a fee at a time which he had no valid license. In 
applying the plain language of the statute, the trial court correctly found Defendant 
represented himself as a private investigator without a license in violation of section 107. 
Defendant alleges he does not satisfy the statutory language of subsection 102(17) 
because he did not receive any consideration from Steve Martin. This contention is 
erroneous. Nowhere in subsection 102(17) does it state that a person must receive or 
exchange consideration before they qualify as a private investigator: "'Private 
investigator or private detective' means any person . . . who, for consideration, engages in 
business or accepts employment to conduct any investigation for the purpose of obtaining 
information . . . ." A fair reading of the plain statutory language shows that the 
investigative work must simply be done for consideration. Whether there is actual 
exchange of consideration is irrelevant so long as consideration is part of the basis of the 
bargain. 
For example, New York's definition of private investigator states, "the business of 
private investigator . . . shall. . . mean . . . the making for hire, reward or for any 
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consideration whatsoever, of any investigation . . . ." N.Y. McKinney's General Business 
Law § 20-7-71(1) (2003). New Mexico's law states that a private investigator is "a 
person who for any consideration whatsoever engages in business or accepts employment 
to conduct investigation for the purpose of obtaining information . . . ." N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 61-27A-2(L) (Michie 2003)(Repealed effective July 1, 2006). Consideration was 
the legislatures chosen word to convey the meaning of the statute which is to prevent 
individuals from accepting business for hire to conduct private investigations. 
The legislature could have required the actual exchange of consideration if it had 
wanted to by inserting language to that effect in this statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31A-21-3 02(2) (stating "no person may charge or receive any consideration for the 
insurance policy which is not stated in Subsection (l))(emphasis added). See also UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 61-1-2(1) (stating f,[i]t is unlawful for any person who receives any 
consideration from another person primarily for advising the other person as to the value 
of securities or their purchase . . . .ff)(emphasis added). 
In fact, Utah Code § 76-7-203 is more analogous to the private investigator statute. 
The statutes states that, "Any person while having custody care, control, or possession of 
any child, who sells, or disposes of, or attempts to sell or dispose of, any child, for an in 
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of value is guilty of a felony in the 
third degree." The Utah Supreme Court held that under this statute it was not necessary 
to show that the defendant "actually received the consideration, so long as there was 
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sufficient evidence that she attempted to engage in a transaction which would have let to 
her receiving consideration." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989)(reversed on 
other grounds). By requiring an actual exchange of consideration, the provisions of 
subsection 107(2), which prohibit the representation of oneself as a private investigator, 
would be rendered meaningless. See Burns, 4 P.3d at 800 (stating courts should attempt 
to give effect to all of a statute's terms). Furthermore, for purposes of section 107, to 
represent oneself is similar to an attempt to act as a private investigator which is similar to 
the statute prohibiting the sale or attempted sale of a child. 
Defendant meets this portion of the private investigator statute which discusses 
consideration because, as Steve Martin's direct examination shows, Defendant discussed 
receiving consideration for the investigation: 
Q. Did you talk about expenses? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. And costs? 
A. He said that it would be $1,000 retainer a, with $500 up front to start the 
investigation. 
Q. Okay. And what would they use the $500 for, did they mention? 
A. Just for a, equipment, fees, setting up surveillance equipment, a, driving. 
R.56:64. 
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Martin's testimony shows the Defendant ready, willing and able to begin 
investigating Martin's fiancee. Defendant unambiguously asks for a money retainer, ? 
which he did not receive because Steve Martin was "shopping" around. R.56:66. The 
only reason investigation did not commence was because Steve Martin did not pay 
Defendant the retainer. However, even though no money was exchanged, Defendant still 
fits within the definition of private investigator because consideration constituted the 
basis of the bargain to perform the investigation. Appellate would not have undertaken 
the investigation freely. The definition of private investigator read in conjunction with 
subsection 107(2)'s language, which states an unlicenced person cannot "act or assume to 
act as, or represent himself to be . . . a private investigator," clearly prohibits both the act 
of being a private investigator for hire and the representation of being a private 
investigator for hire. The trial court properly made this distinction and rejected 
Defendant's erroneous reading of the statute. 
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III. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN AND LISTEN TO A TAPE OF 
A CONVERSATION DEFENDANT HAD WITH AN UNDERCOVER 
INVESTIGATOR DOES NOT AMOUNT TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BECAUSE COUNSEL MADE HIS DECISION AFTER 
REASONABLE INVESTIGATION. 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in part, provides, "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of counsel for 
his defence." The right to counsel has been interpreted to mean the "effective assistance 
of counsel." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must 
satisfy the two prong test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
"Defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of this test." Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. 
The first prong requires a defendant show that counsel's performance was "deficient", in 
the sense that counsel made errors serious enough to prejudice the defendant's right to a 
fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The second prong requires a defendant show that 
counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. Templin, 805 P.2d at 186-
87. The purpose of the Strickland test is to protect the defendant's constitutional right to 
a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684. 
When examining counsel's deficiency, 
[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is 
all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after 
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining 
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counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . Because of the 
difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be 
considered sound trial strategy'. 
Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,101 (1955)). See State v. Tyler, 
850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993) (deciding that "competency of counsel is not measured 
by the result")(internal quotations omitted); State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 
1991) (finding that courts "will not review counsel's tactical decisions simply because 
another lawyer, e.g., appellate counsel, would have taken a different course"); State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989) (concluding that a legitimate exercise of 
professional judgment in the choice of trial strategy that does not produce the results 
expected does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Tennyson, 850 
P.2d 461, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a court "will not second-guess trial 
counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those choices might appear in 
retrospect"). 
In the instant case, Defendant alleges his attorney rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel when he failed to obtain and listen to the alleged conversation taped between 
Defendant and Steve Martin. This argument is without merit. 
Counsel is effective if he or she makes tactical decisions after reasonable 
investigation. State v. Huggins, 920 P.2d 1195, 1198-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In 
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Huggins, the Court of Appeals stated, "counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigation 
unnecessary." Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91). Defense counsel's refusal to 
seek the tape as additional evidence was a tactical decision made after reasonable 
investigation. Approximately a week before trial, the prosecutor received the tape 
containing the alleged conversation recorded during the sting. He called and made it 
available to Defense counsel. R. 56:118. Defense counsel refused the tape because he 
already had a copy of the incident report, which contained a description of the tape's 
contents and he had a description of the conversation from his client. Counsel most likely 
viewed the tape as unnecessary because he sought to defend the case on the following 
grounds: that Defendant was properly licensed to perform the services he offered, R. 
56:10,40; that Defendant did not fit the statutory language he was accused of violating, R. 
56:10, 71-78, 124-27; and that the sting was a government action enforcing a non-
competition agreement, R. 56:10, 122-23. Counsel's refusal to listen to the tape 
apparently rested on the rational that the information gained from the tape would be 
cumulative and unnecessary. R. 56:118. Defense Counsel's decision was made after 
reasonable investigation to determine what the contents of the tape were. 
It may be reasonably inferred from the foregoing events that when this tape 
surfaced a week before trial, that Defense counsel already had his theory of the case. As 
part of his defense strategy, counsel would not to dispute what was said during the sting, 
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but rather assert that Defendant was licensed to offer such services, that Defendant did 
not fit the statutory language, and that this was a government action enforcing a non-
competition agreement. These defense theories necessarily rendered the actual 
conversation contained on the tape irrelevant and unnecessary. Though these defense 
theories proved unfruitful at trial, it does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel 
simply because counsel elected to go forward with one theory as opposed to another. 
Counsel may have viewed the tape has harmful and thus been relieved it was not offered 
at trial. See Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 876-77 (Utah 1993)(stating that if counsel 
believes that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or harmful, then a court 
should not question that decision on trial strategy unless it was based on an unreasonable 
belief). A court should not second guess trial tactics such as what objections to make, 
what witnessed to call, and what defenses to interpose. Id. at 876. 
One of the issues raised on this appeal is that Defendant does not meet the 
statutory language of section 107. This is precisely one of the grounds upon which 
Defense counsel sought to defend Defendant at trial. Defendant cannot now assert that 
such a theory was unreasonable and amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. ff[A]n 
unfavorable result is not sufficient for and does not give rise to a conclusion of ineffective 
assistance of counsel." State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1985). 
Though Defense counsel's theory of defense may have been a poor one in 
retrospect, the Court must still indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's actions 
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might be considered sound trial strategy and fall within the broad parameters afforded 
counsel. Defense counsel was very familiar with the facts, circumstances and law 
regarding this case. It was only a week before trial when the prosecutor obtained and 
offered the tape. R. 56:118. It is apparent that Defense counsel had already devised a 
theory of the case which rendered the additional evidence of the tape unnecessary. 
Choosing not to review what he viewed as unnecessary because it did not corroborate his 
theory of the case is not unreasonable. Therefore, applying the Strickland presumptions 
to the facts, Defendant does not satisfy the first prong test, and thus fails the ineffective 
assistance of counsel test. 
The second prong requires a defendant show that counsel's deficient performance 
was prejudicial to his defense. To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Defendant's proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be based on a speculative 
matter, but must be based on a demonstrable reality. State v. Coonce, 36 P.3d 533, 539 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001)(quoting Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877. Here, Defendant's allegations 
only amount to speculation. 
Defendant states that ,f[b]y failing to obtain the tape Defendant's attorney was not 
prepared to conduct an effective cross examination, he was unable to resolve and prepare 
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the State's witness and the Defendant, and he was incapable of being able to properly 
advise the Defendant whether he ought to go to trial or accept a plea bargain." 
(Appellant's brief at 18). These conclusory statements fail the Strickland test5 s second-
prong by failing to show how these allegations were prejudicial to Defendant. 
Defendant must direct the Court to a particular piece of evidence from the tape 
which would have resulting in a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. 
Coonce, 36 P.3d at 539. In Coonce, the defendant claimed his counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to impeach a witness with her tape-recorded statements made to the 
police. But because the contents of the tape we not in the record, the Utah Court of 
Appeals dismissed this claim as speculative. Id. 
Defendant fails to identify any section of the cross examination that was 
prejudicial to his defense because Defense counsel failed to listen to the tape. Defendant 
fails to identify any specific part of the record showing prejudice because of Defense 
counsel's inability to resolve and prepare the State's witness and the Defendant. 
Defendant fails to show how the lack of the tape prevented Defense counsel from 
effectively advising him during plea negotiations. For all the above allegations, 
Defendant has failed to provide the Court with any supporting evidence, either pursuant 
to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, or by citing to any of part of the record 
to support his ineffective assistance claim. By failing to provide the Court with any 
supporting evidence, this Court should decline to even consider it. See State v. Callahan, 
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866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (disposing of claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel where neither the record nor defendant's brief identified witnesses that counsel 
failed to subpoena or alleged the substance of their testimony). 
By failing to cite to anything specific in the record, Defendant asks this Court to 
indulge in speculation as to how Defense counsel's actions were prejudicial. However, 
courts should not entertain such conclusory and speculative arguments. See Fernandez, 
870 P.2d at 877 ("Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter 
but must be demonstrable reality."). Therefore, by failing to marshal any evidentiary 
support showing how the result at trial would have been different had Defense counsel 
sought the tape, Defendant has not satisfied the second prong of the Strickland test. 
Appellant also alleges that Defense counsel's failure to object to the Prosecutor's 
statement as the date of the sting amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. Because 
proof of the exact date of the offense is not a requirement in this case, and the State 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the sting occurred when Defendant was not 
licensed, Defense counsel's failure to object amounts, at most, to harmless error. 
If a defendant fails to satisfy both prongs, it cannot be said that the conviction 
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (stating that the defendant bears the burden of proof in 
establishing that he was denied a fair trial). Here, Defendant has failed to satisfy either 
prong of the Strickland test, and thus was afforded effective assistance of counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
The State has met its burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant 
solicited his services as a private investigator when he was without a license. 
Furthermore, the Act does not require an actual exchange of consideration. Finally, the 
Defendant has failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective. The defendant has 
failed to identify any specific prejudice he suffered because of defense counsel alleged 
error. For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
Defendant's conviction. No addendum is necessary. 
Dated this M day of September 2003. 
Jeward 
DeputylVeber County Attorney 
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